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Using data from the 2001-2005 waves of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics 
in Australia survey, and taking account of existing estimates of ability bias and social 
returns to schooling, I estimate the economic return to various levels of education. 
Raising high school attainment appears to yield the highest annual benefits, with per-year 
gains as high as 30 percent (depending on the adjustment for ability bias). Some forms of 
vocational training also appear to boost earnings, with significant gains from Certificate 
Level III/IV qualifications (for high school dropouts only), and from Diploma and 
Advanced Diploma qualifications. At the university level, Bachelor degrees and 
postgraduate qualifications are associated with significantly higher earnings, with each 
year of a Bachelor degree raising annual earnings by about 15 percent. For high school, 
slightly less than half the gains are due to increased productivity, with the rest due to 
higher levels of participation. For vocational training, about one-third of the gains are 
from productivity, and two-thirds from greater participation.  For university, most of the 
gains are from productivity. I find some evidence that the productivity benefits of 
education are higher towards the top of the distribution, but the participation effects are 
higher towards the bottom of the conditional earnings distribution.  
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  ii1   Introduction 
The effect of human capital on income is an issue of central importance to economists 
and public policymakers alike. Comparing income differentials within countries, labour 
economists have generally found that better-educated workers earn higher wages and are 
more likely to participate in the labour force, while comparisons across countries have 
tended to yield the conclusion that raising levels of schooling will increase national 
incomes. From a policy perspective, the challenge is to determine how best to allocate 
scarce resources across types of education. Will the benefit of a marginal dollar be higher 
if it is invested in schools, technical education or universities?  
Empirically, a significant challenge in estimating the returns to education is to 
take account of ability bias. If higher ability workers undertake more formal education, 
then the observed correlation between education and earnings may not be an accurate 
reflection of the causal impact of education on earnings. Another factor affecting 
estimates of the returns to education is the potential divergence between private and 
social returns to education. If education has substantial positive externalities, then the 
social benefits of higher education may be larger than the sum of the private benefits. 
Since policies should be based upon estimates of the social benefits of education taking 
account of externalities and social costs is potentially an important exercise.   
  This paper draws upon recent research on ability bias and the social rate of return, 
and uses these to inform estimates of returns to particular educational qualifications in 
Australia. However, a drawback of the ability bias and social returns literatures is that 
they typically do not estimate returns across a variety of educational qualifications. To 
address this limitation, I therefore estimate returns to a variety of specific educational 
attainments – years of schooling, trade qualifications, and university qualifications. If the 
extent of ability bias does not differ significantly across educational qualifications, the 
ability bias estimates in natural experiment studies can be used to adjust the returns to all 
educational qualifications. 
  This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses Australian and 
international evidence on ability bias. Section 3 discusses estimates of the gap between 
private and social returns to education. Section 4 estimates the relationship between 
earning and the educational attainment, and the final section concludes. 
 
  iii2   Ability Bias 
Researchers have long recognised that those who undertake more education may possess 
traits that would have led them to perform better in the labour market, even in the 
absence of obtaining higher levels of education. For example, individuals with better 
innate cognitive skills may find education easier, and therefore be more likely to 
complete school or undertake post-school qualifications. Assuming that workers with 
higher cognitive skills earn higher wages regardless of their level of education, the 
observed correlation between education and income will reflect both education and 
cognitive ability. Of course, the relationship could also go the other way. For example, 
since the cost of schooling will be higher to those with better outside opportunities, it is 
possible that lower-ability people may be more likely to undertake formal education. 
To deal with this problem, some economists have sought to exploit natural 
experiments. The three most commonly used strategies are comparisons between 
identical twins, comparisons between individuals born at different times of the year, and 
regional variation in compulsory schooling laws. It is useful to discuss each in turn. 
Twin-pair comparisons operate on the assumption that both twins have the same 
level of ability, and differ only in their education. Since twins were born on the same day, 
raised in the same household, and have similar genes (or identical genes, in the case of 
monozygotic twins), researchers assume that they would otherwise have the same labour 
market outcomes, were it not for the fact that one obtained more education than the other. 
Important studies of the return to education using US twins include Ashenfelter and 
Krueger (1994), Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998), and Behrman, Rosenzweig and Taubman 
(1994). This approach has also been implemented in other countries, including Australia 
(Miller, Mulvey and Martin, 1995, 2006), China (Zhang, Liu and Yung, 2007), Sweden 
(Isacsson, 1999) and the United Kingdom (Bonjour et al., 2003).  In the Australian 
context, Miller, Mulvey and Martin (2006) estimate returns to education using twins 
studies that suggest upwards ability bias in the order of 10-28 percent. This is similar to 
the findings of Card (1999), who reviews US studies that estimate returns to education 
using twin-pair comparisons, and concludes that upwards ability bias is in the order of 10 
percent.  
A second approach to addressing the ability bias problem is to compare 
individuals born at different times of the year. Imagine two students: student A is born on 
the eligibility date for school entry, and student B is born one day after the eligibility date 
for school entry. Because of the discontinuous operation of the entry rules, student A will 
  ivstart school one year earlier than student B – despite being only one day older. If both 
students leave school as soon as they reach the school leaving age, student A will have 
one year minus one day more schooling than student B. Using birth date as an instrument 
for schooling was first implemented in Angrist and Krueger (1991), whose instrumental 
variables (IV) results were nearly 30 percent higher than their ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimates. Webbink and van Wassenberg (2004) reached similar conclusions using 
data from the Netherlands (though Plug, 2001 found lower estimates and argued that the 
Dutch effect operated through relative position, not total schooling). In the Australian 
context, Leigh and Ryan (2007) found that in their preferred specification, the IV 
estimate was lower than the OLS estimate, suggesting an upwards ability bias of 39 
percent. 
A third strategy for dealing with ability bias is to use changes in compulsory 
schooling laws across states. For the US, Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) estimated a 
private rate of return to schooling that suggested virtually no ability bias in the OLS 
estimates. Oreopoulos (2003) used changes in school leaving laws in states/provinces in 
three countries: for the US, his IV estimates were nearly double the corresponding OLS 
estimate, while for Britain and Canada, his OLS and IV estimates were almost identical. 
In Norway, Aakvik, Salvanes and Vaage (2003) used variation in school reforms across 
municipalities, and found IV estimates about 30 percent higher than their OLS estimates. 
Exploiting variation in compulsory schooling laws across Australian states, Leigh and 
Ryan (2007) found that in their preferred specification, ability bias was in the order of 9 
percent. 
Other approaches to addressing the ability bias problem have tended to find IV 
results that are equal to or larger than OLS estimates. For example, Card (1995) used 
geographic proximity to college to estimate the returns to university for young men in the 
US, and concluded that the IV estimate was higher than the comparable OLS estimate, by 
a factor of 25-60 percent. A similar approach is that of Becker and Siebern-Thomas 
(2001), who used geographic variation in the quality of schooling infrastructure across 
German states, and found that their IV estimates were nearly double the size of the 
comparable IV estimates. Rummery, Vella and Verbeek (1999) used a rank-order 
instrumental variables estimator to estimate returns to education for Australian youth, and 
concluded that the degree of ability bias was negligible. 
Summing up the US literature on instrumental variables approaches to 
overcoming the ability bias problem, Card (1999) concludes that IV estimates are 
  vtypically 20-40 percent higher than the corresponding OLS estimates. Part of the 
explanation for this may be that these instruments primarily affect disadvantaged 
subgroups of the population, for whom the marginal returns to education may be higher. 
Although fewer quasi-experimental studies have been conducted in Australia, work by 
Rummery, Vella and Verbeek (1999), Miller, Mulvey and Martin (2006), and Leigh and 
Ryan (2007) has not found evidence that ability-adjusted returns are significantly higher 
than OLS returns (and may be lower). One way to reconcile the Australian and US 
findings is that rates of educational attainment in the US have been significantly higher 
than in Australia, and hence that those affected by compulsory schooling laws are not 
noticeably different from the median worker. 
In what follows, I therefore present two sets of results – one assuming that OLS 
estimates of the returns to education are unbiased, and another assuming that OLS returns 
are biased upwards by 10 percent. For readers who take the view that the ability bias is 
outside this range, it is relatively straightforward to adjust the estimates accordingly.  
 
3   Social Returns to Education 
It has long been recognised that the social rate of return to education may be lower or 
higher than the sum of individuals’ private rates of return. For example, if education is 
merely a credential, signalling ability without raising productivity, then the social return 
might be lower than the private return.
1 Another possibility is that taking account of 
governments subsidies to education will drive down the social returns. 
Alternatively, education might have a positive externality. For example, society 
will save money if education lowers the probability that an individual will commit a 
crime, be in poor health, or use welfare.
2,3  Another possibility is that, if labour markets 
are not perfectly competitive, the increase in value-added per worker caused by higher 
levels of education may not be fully captured in increased wages (Dearden et al., 2000). 
And it may be the case that an increase in education for the current generation raises 
                                                 
1 The classic signalling model of education is that of Spence (1973). In the Australian context, Quiggin 
(1999) presents several pieces of evidence that suggest that signalling does not explain a significant portion 
of the observed returns to education. 
2 In theory, the impact of education on crime is ambiguous, since it depends on the returns to education in 
the legal and illegal sectors. However, empirical studies have tended to find that education lowers crime 
rates (see eg. Lochner and Moretti, 2004).  
3 Education most likely improves health because better-educated people are more effective at maintaining 
and improving their health. See Grossman and Kaestner (1997) for a review of this literature. 
  vieducational attainment for the next generation (Wolfe and Havemann 2001; Oreopoulos 
et al., 2006) 
As Abelson (2003, pp.313-315) points out, the externalities of education are 
easier to list than they are to measure. Generally speaking, attempts to quantify social 
returns to education have found them to be modest at best. For example, Acemoglu and 
Angrist (2000) estimate that external returns to education are around 1 percent and not 
significantly different from zero, while a literature review by Psacharopoulos and 
Patrinos (2004) find mixed evidence, suggesting that social returns might be lower or 
higher than private returns. Recent work by the OECD (2006, p.130) compares a measure 
of private returns (the increase in after-tax earnings less costs of undertaking education) 
with a proxy for social returns (the sum of private returns, plus increased tax revenue, 
less the cost of providing education). For most of the 11 developed countries in the study, 
the OECD finds that the social returns to education are lower than the private returns 
(though since the study did not cover Australia, it should be regarded as suggestive rather 
than definitive). 
In the absence of strong evidence for educational externalities, I assume that the 
social return is equal to the mean increase in pre-tax earnings. This takes account of the 
increase in taxation revenue that flows from higher educational attainment, but ignores 
indirect benefits such as higher value-added (to the extent that this is not captured in 
wages), intergenerational benefits, and less tangible benefits such as higher levels of 
political participation. To the extent that education lowers the chance that an individual 
will fall sick or enter the criminal justice system, the approach used in this paper takes 
account of the fall in earnings associated with such episodes, but not the public cost of 
hospitals and prisons. 
 
4   Labour Market Outcomes and Educational Attainment 
In estimating the returns to education, I use a standard OLS regression of earnings on 
educational and demographic characteristics. Following Mincer (1974), this takes the 
form: 
 
ln Yit = β0 + β1Eit +  β2Xit + γt + εi t        (1) 
 
In this equation, Y is a measure of the earnings of individual i in year t, and E is a vector 
of educational levels. X is a vector of individual characteristics, comprising indicator 
  viivariables for single years of actual work experience, interacted with gender dummies. 
This allows for a fully flexible experience-earnings profile, which differs between men 
and women. Finally, γ is a survey year fixed effect, and ε is a disturbance term.  
Earnings data are drawn from five waves of the Household, Income and Labour 
Dynamics in Australia survey (HILDA), carried out in the years 2001-2005. The sample 
size for the entire survey ranged from 19,914 in 2001 to 17,469 in 2005, with the sample 
drawn randomly from the Australian population. For more information about HILDA, see 
Goode and Watson (2007). For present purposes, HILDA represents the most up-to-date 
microdata that are publicly available, and has the advantage that it contains a measure of 
actual labour market experience. The five waves are simply treated as pooled cross-
sectional surveys (I do not exploit the panel aspect of HILDA). To account for the fact 
that the same individuals’ labour market outcomes may be correlated over time, standard 
errors are clustered at the person level. 
From a practical standpoint, HILDA is also much more useful to researchers than 
most datasets that are collected by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). For 
researchers who wish to use ABS datasets on their own computer, the ABS has now 
adopted the practice of grouping variables such as hours worked and age into bands, 
thereby considerably diminishing the precision with which Mincer earnings equations can 
be estimated. The effect of this has been to diminish the value of ABS data for labour 
market researchers. 
Respondents are restricted to those aged between 25 and 64 in the year of the 
survey. This age restriction is designed to cover the working population, and to ensure 
that most respondents have had adequate time to complete their education. Respondents 
who are studying full-time or part-time are also dropped.  
  In estimating returns to education, a common approach is to convert all forms of 
education into years of education, and then to estimate the effect of an additional year of 
schooling on earnings or labour market participation. While such an approach has the 
virtue of simplicity, it effectively constrains the returns to an additional year of education 
to be the same for all types of schooling. Here, the focus is on different types of 
schooling, so I separately analyse schooling, vocational education, and university. In 
doing so, it is important to recognise that individuals follow different educational 
pathways. For example, among those who have finished grade 12, 44 percent have a 
university degree as their highest qualification, while only 11 percent have a Certificate 
Level III/IV as their highest qualification. By contrast, among those who have not 
  viiifinished grade 12, 28 percent have a Certificate Level III/IV as their highest qualification.  
It is therefore plausible that post-school education is tailored according to the level of 
high schooling that the typical student has attained, and that the returns to post-school 
education may differ systematically by high school attainment.   
Table 1 shows the breakdown of educational qualifications in the sample.  
--------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
--------------- 
To test for productivity and participation effects, I estimate three sets of 
regressions. The first set of regressions uses as the dependent variable pre-tax log hourly 
wages. The second uses log pre-tax annual earnings. Both wages and earnings are logged 
on the basis that the semi-log specification has been shown to fit the data well across 
various developed nations (see eg. Krueger and Lindahl, 2001). Inherent in such a 
specification is the notion that education increases income in a proportional manner (eg. 
by y percent), rather than by a fixed sum (eg. by y dollars). A further advantage of this 
set-up is that regression coefficients can approximately be interpreted as percentage 
effects. The approximation is more precise the closer the effect sizes are to zero. Since 
some of the estimated effects are quite large, I also convert all education coefficients into 
percentage effects. 
The main disadvantage of using logs is that the relationship between education 
and income can only be estimated for those with positive income. For this reason, I 
estimate a third regression, in which the dependent variable is an indicator denoting 
whether the respondent had positive earned income in the previous financial year. This 
regression is estimated using a probit model, and takes the following form: 
 
Pr(Y>0) it = β0 + β1Eit +  β2Xit + γt + εit      (2) 
 
The relationship between education and hourly wages (shown in the first column 
of Tables 2, 3 and 4) may be regarded as capturing the productivity effect. The 
relationship between education and annual earnings (shown in the second column) may 
be regarded as capturing both productivity and participation. The relationship between 
education and having positive annual earnings (shown in the third column) may be 
regarded as capturing participation only. 
  ixTo begin, I focus on the relationship between high school completion and 
earnings. To ensure that effects are not contaminated by those who have undertaken post-
school education, the sample is restricted to respondents with between 9 and 12 years of 
schooling, and no post-school qualifications. (An alternative approach – including all 
respondents, and controlling for post-school qualifications – produces very similar 
results.
4)  
Table 2 shows the results of these regressions. Panel A presents the basic 
regression results, while Panel B converts the regression coefficients into percentage 
effects (assuming no ability bias), and Panel C converts the regression coefficients into 
percentage effects (assuming a 10 percent upwards ability bias).  
Assuming no ability bias, the results in Panel B suggest that, compared with those 
who completed grade 9, respondents who completed grades 10 or 11 have hourly wages 
that are 10 percent higher, while respondents who finish grade 12 have hourly wages that 
are 23 percent higher. The effects are higher still when participation effects are taken into 
account: log annual earnings are 22 percent higher for grade 10 completers, 30 percent 
higher for grade 11 completers, and 64 percent higher for grade 12 completers. In all 
cases, more schooling is also associated with a greater probability of reporting positive 
earnings, with the increase ranging from 5 to 19 percentage points. These results suggest 
that although the hourly wage effects of schooling are very large, less than half of the 
impact of high school on annual earnings occurs through productivity (hourly wages), 
with the coefficients on annual earnings being at least twice as large as the coefficients on 
hourly wages. 
Notably, the increase in earnings from attaining grade 11 (for which there is 
typically no credential awarded) is smaller than the increase in earnings from attaining 
grades 10 or 12 (which are typically associated with the award of some credential). This 
provides some evidence of a ‘sheepskin effect’ in Australian schooling. 
Assuming that returns to education from Mincer-type earnings equations are 
biased upwards by 10 percent due to ability bias, Panel C scales down the estimated 
coefficients by 10 percent. Even if this is the correct estimate of the causal effect of 
schooling on earnings, the benefits to school completion remain extremely large, 
particularly for respondents who complete grade 12.  
                                                 
4 With this approach, the coefficients for grades 10, 11 and 12 respectively are 0.099, 0.117, and 0.197 in 
the hourly wage specification; 0.172, 0.252, and 0.394 in the annual income specification; and 0.051, 
0.097, and 0.144 in the positive income specification. All are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
  x--------------- 
Insert Table 2 here 
--------------- 
Recalling the earlier discussion about educational pathways, I next turn to consider 
post-school qualifications aimed at those who have not completed high school. The 
HILDA dataset asks respondents about three types of vocational training: Certificate 
Level I or II; Certificate Level III or IV; and Diplomas and Advanced Diplomas.
5 These 
are defined by the ABS (2001) as follows: 
 
•  Certificate level I and II provides a knowledge and skills base ranging from basic 
knowledge in a narrow range of areas to basic operational knowledge in a moderate 
range of areas. The focus is on basic practical skills with some theoretical component 
and a prescribed range of functions involving known routines and procedures with 
some accountability for the quality of outcomes, underpinned by a basic knowledge in 
a range of areas. Entry to this level is by various pathways which may include the 
completion of Year 10 or equivalent, or completion of a recognised programme 
and/or recognition of prior learning. 
•  Certificate level III and IV provides a broad knowledge base incorporating some 
theoretical concepts and the skills necessary to perform a broad range of skilled 
applications, to provide technical advice of a complex nature and to provide 
workgroup leadership when organising activities. The focus is on the application of a 
defined range of well developed skills to a variety of predictable or unpredictable 
problems in a specific field, with a general understanding of the underlying theories 
and methods related to that field. Entry to this level is by various pathways which 
may include the completion of Year 10 or equivalent, or higher, or completion of a 
recognised programme and/or recognition of prior learning 
•  Diploma level provides a broad knowledge and skills base, incorporating theoretical 
concepts, with substantial depth in some areas. The focus is on the application of 
theoretical concepts and technical or creative skills to a range of situations and the 
evaluation of information. Education at this level may also develop basic 
management and administrative skills. Entry to this level is by various pathways 
                                                 
5 Some HILDA respondents stated that they held a Certificate, but did not define the level. Since only a 
small number of respondents (less than 0.5 percent of the total sample) fell into this category, I drop them 
from the analysis. 
  xiwhich may include the completion of Year 12 or equivalent, or completion of a 
recognised programme and/or recognition of prior learning. 
•  Advanced Diploma and associate degree level provides a highly specialised 
knowledge and skills base, incorporating theoretical, technical, creative or 
conceptual skills, with substantial depth in some areas. The focus is on applying a 
significant range of fundamental principles and complex techniques across a wide 
and often unpredictable variety of contexts in relation to either varied or highly 
specific functions. Education at this level includes analysing information and 
concepts at an abstract level and executing judgements across a range of technical 
and management functions. Entry to this level is by various pathways which may 
include the completion of Year 12 or equivalent, or completion of a recognised 
programme and/or recognition of prior learning. 
In essence, Certificate I/II qualifications primarily provide operational knowledge, 
and require little prior schooling; Certificate III/IV qualifications provide greater 
theoretical depth and focus on a broader range of skills; and Diploma qualifications 
incorporate an even greater focus on fundamental principles and conceptual skills, 
generally with grade 12 schooling or its equivalent as a prerequisite. 
Table 3 restricts the sample to respondents with 11 or fewer years of schooling (but 
controls for single years of schooling). As in the previous table, the dependent variable is 
hourly wages in the first column, annual earnings in the second column, and an indicator 
for positive annual earnings in the third column. Again, Panel B converts the coefficients 
into percentage effects assuming no ability bias, while Panel C converts the coefficients 
into percentage effects, assuming a 10 percent upwards ability bias. 
--------------- 
Insert Table 3 here 
--------------- 
The results suggest that – for individuals who have not finished high school – the 
increase in hourly earnings (the productivity benefit) is 7 percent for Certificate III-IV, 
and 12-13 percent for Diplomas (hourly wage returns to Certificate Level I/II 
qualifications are not statistically significant). The increase in annual earnings associated 
with Certificate III/IV qualifications and Diplomas is around 3 times as large as the 
hourly wage benefit – in the order of 19-21 percent. (For annual earnings, the coefficient 
on Certificate Level I/II qualifications is negative, but not statistically significant.) All 
three forms of vocational education are associated with higher participation rates: 16 
  xiipercentage point higher for Certificate I/II, 5 percentage points higher for Certificate 
III/IV, and 7 percentage points higher for Diplomas. This suggests that higher-level 
vocational training has an economic payoff, but that it is mostly through participation 
rather than productivity effects.  
In Table 4, I estimate the returns to post-school qualifications, relative to 
respondents with 12 years of schooling and no post-school qualifications. In addition to 
Certificate III/IV qualifications and Diplomas, I now estimate the returns to three types of 
university qualifications: Bachelor degrees, Graduate Diplomas/Certificates, and 
Masters/Doctorate degrees. (Certificate I/II are regarded as a lower level of educational 
attainment than grade 12, so there are no respondents in the sample who are observed 
with 12 years of schooling and a Certificate Level I/II.) 
For those who have completed grade 12, Certificate III/IV qualifications appear to 
have no effect on productivity or participation, while Diplomas increase hourly wages by 
13-14 percent, and annual earnings by 17-19 percent. The economic returns to Bachelor 
degrees are around twice as large as the returns to Diplomas. Bachelor degrees are 
associated with a 32-35 percent increase in hourly wages, and a 45-50 percent increase in 
annual earnings. Those with Graduate Diplomas and Graduate Certificates earn hourly 
wages that are 35-39 percent higher, and annual earnings that are 42-46 percent higher. 
Those with Masters degrees and Doctorates earn hourly wages that are 41-45 percent 
higher, and annual earnings that are 66-74 percent higher. All three forms of university 
qualifications are associated with a 10-11 percentage point increase in labour force 
participation. 
--------------- 
Insert Table 4 here 
--------------- 
The estimates above show the average effect of education on earnings. However, 
it is plausible that the benefits of education differ across the conditional earnings 
distribution. For example, a remedial education program might have a stronger effect on 
raising earnings at the bottom of the distribution, while an education program tailored 
towards high-ability students might have a larger impact on the top of the distribution. 
One way to test this is by estimating interquartile regressions, formally testing 
whether the returns to education at the 75th percentile of the conditional earnings 
distribution are different from the returns to education at the 25th percentile of the 
distribution.  Table 5 shows the results of this exercise. The general pattern that emerges 
  xiiiis that the hourly wage effects of education appear to be slightly higher at the top of the 
conditional earnings distribution. This is true for grade 12, Certificate III/IV (for high 
school dropouts), Diplomas (for high school dropouts), and Bachelor degrees. The only 
exception is the return to Certificate III/IV (for high school graduates), which seems to 
yield larger returns for those towards the bottom of the conditional earnings distribution: 
a finding consistent with this qualification being primarily directed at high school 
dropouts. 
By contrast, using log annual earnings as the dependent variable indicates that 
returns are typically higher towards the bottom of the conditional earnings distribution. 
The annual earnings gain associated with grade 12, Certificate III/IV (for high school 
dropouts), and a Masters/Doctorate. Since the participation gains are, on average, larger 
than the productivity gains (Tables 2-4), this suggests that while those at the 75
th 
percentile gain a larger productivity benefit from education, those at the 25
th percentile 
gain a larger participation benefit.   
--------------- 
Insert Table 5 here 
--------------- 
Lastly, I compare the returns to various educational qualifications on a per-year 
basis. Since there is no firm duration for most qualifications, it is necessary to make some 
assumptions about the number of full time equivalent years that would be required. In 
Table 6, I assume that each year of high schooling takes 1 year (ie. ignoring the 
possibility of students repeating a grade). The marginal benefit of grade 11 is estimated 
as the return to completing grade 11 minus the return to completing grade 10 (and 
similarly for the marginal return to completing grade 12). Post-school qualifications are 
assigned the following durations: 0.5 years for Certificate I/II, 1 year for Certificate 
III/IV, 2 years for a Diploma or Advanced Diploma, 3 years for a Bachelor degree, 
Bachelor degree, 4 years for a Graduate Diploma or Graduate Certificate, and 5 years for 
a Masters or Doctorate (note that the last two estimates include the time taken to 
complete a Bachelor degree). I then divide the returns in Tables 2-4 by the respective 
number of years. To conserve space, I show only the returns that assume a 10 percent 
ability bias (ie. those in Panel C). This does not affect the relative comparisons. 
The results from this comparison suggest that the per-year productivity gains are 
largest for grade 12 and Bachelor degrees, both of which boost hourly wages by 11 
percent. For annual earnings, per-year benefits are largest from high school, with year 10 
  xivcompletion boosting annual earnings by 20 percent, and year 12 completion boosting 
annual earnings by 30 percent. For positive earnings, per-year benefits are largest from 
high school and vocational education. 
--------------- 
Insert Table 6 here 
--------------- 
 
5   Conclusion 
Using ability bias estimates in the published literature, I estimate returns to a wide variety 
of educational qualifications. These estimates suggest that the increase in hourly wages 
from raising educational attainment by one year is in the order of 8-11 percent. 
Comparing across high school attendance, vocational training, and university, the 
productivity gain appears to be largest for grade 12 completion and Bachelor degree 
completion. On a per-year basis, the lowest hourly wage returns are from grade 11, 
Certificate I/II (for high school dropouts), and Certificate III/IV (for high school 
graduates). 
When participation effects – on the intensive and extensive margin – are taken 
into account, the benefits of education and training are larger still. This calculation 
favours high schooling the most. For example, the annual earnings increase from 
completing year 12 is estimated to be a massive 30 percent. This suggests that greater 
policy attention should be given to increasing school completion rates in Australia. 
Within the vocational training sector, I find no significant earnings boost 
associated with Certificate I/II qualifications, but substantial increases associated with 
Certificate III/IV (for high school dropouts), and Diplomas. Interquartile regressions 
suggest that the hourly wage benefits of education tend to be higher at the 75
th percentile 
than at the 25
th percentile, while annual earnings benefits tend to be higher at the bottom 
of the distribution. Although these calculations have not taken into account the costs of 
education (in the form of tuition and foregone earnings), the fact that foregone earnings 
are lowest for high schooling (coupled with the fact that the increase in earnings is 
biggest) suggests that the net returns are likely to also be larger for high schooling than 
for vocational training or university education.  
A key assumption in this methodology is that the extent of ability bias estimated in 
natural experiment studies (most of which is based on differences in high school 
attainment) can be applied to all educational qualifications. To the extent that ability bias 
  xvdiffers substantially between high schooling, vocational training, and university, this 
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  xixTABLE 1 
DISTRIBUTION OF EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS 
 
High school sample (used in Table 2) 







Grade 9  9%  10%  12% 
Grade  10  39% 39% 42% 
Grade  11  17% 17% 16% 
Grade  12  35% 35% 31% 
N 8969  9796  15394 
Vocational training sample (used in Table 3) 
Respondents with 11 or fewer years of schooling 
No post-school qualifications  58%  58%  64% 
Certificate Level I or II  3%  3%  3% 
Certificate Level III or IV  33%  32%  28% 
Diploma or Advanced Diploma  7%  7%  6% 
N  11635 12658 20642 
Post-school qualifications sample (used in Table 4) 
Respondents with 12 years of schooling 
No post-school qualifications  28%  28%  31% 
Certificate Level III or IV  10%  10%  11% 
Diploma or Advanced Diploma  13%  13%  14% 
Bachelor  degree  29% 29% 27% 
Graduate Diploma or Graduate 
Certificate 
12% 12% 10% 
Masters  or  Doctorate  8% 8% 7% 
N  11414 12273 15348 
Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.  All respondents are aged between 25 and 64, and 
not presently studying. A small number of respondents have university qualifications, but did not complete 
high school. These individuals are not included in the analysis. 
  xx 
TABLE 2 
HIGH SCHOOL AND EARNINGS 
 
Sample is respondents with 9-12 years of schooling and no post-school qualifications. 
All estimates are relative to those who left school at the end of grade 9. 
Panel A: Regression results 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 




Grade 10  0.094***  0.199***  0.047* 
 [0.032]  [0.070]  [0.025] 
Grade 11  0.099***  0.263***  0.131*** 
 [0.034]  [0.074]  [0.026] 
Grade 12  0.208***  0.493***  0.186*** 
 [0.033]  [0.071]  [0.024] 
Observations 8969  9796  15394 
R
2 or Pseudo-R
2 0.07  0.19  0.12 
Panel B: Percentage effects - assuming no ability bias 
Grade 10  10%  22%  5% 
Grade  11  10% 30% 13% 
Grade  12  23% 64% 19% 
Panel C: Percentage effects - assuming 10% upwards ability bias 
Grade  10  9% 20% 5% 
Grade 11  9%  27%  13% 
Grade  12  21% 57% 19% 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the person level, in brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. All specifications are estimated for respondents 
aged between 25 and 64, and not presently studying. Specifications in column 1 are restricted to those with 
positive hourly wages, and specifications in column 2 are restricted to those with positive annual earnings. 
Regressions in columns 1 and 2 are estimated using OLS, and estimates in column 3 are marginal effects 
from a probit model. All regressions include indicator variables for each single year of experience, 
interacted with the respondent’s sex, plus year fixed effects. For columns 1 and 2, results in Panels B and C 
are calculated as exp(β)-1 and 0.9*(exp(β)-1), respectively. For column 3, results in Panels B and C are 
identical to the marginal effects shown in Panel A. 
  xxiTABLE 3 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND EARNINGS 
 
Sample is respondents with 11 or fewer years of schooling. All estimates are relative to 
those with 11 or fewer years of schooling and no post-school qualifications. 
Panel A: Regression results 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 




Certificate Level I or II  0.003  -0.058  0.155*** 
 [0.049]  [0.101]  [0.033] 
Certificate Level III or IV  0.072***  0.187***  0.047*** 
 [0.016]  [0.029]  [0.016] 
Diploma or Advanced 
Diploma 0.124***  0.201***  0.071*** 
 [0.032]  [0.055]  [0.027] 
Observations 11635  12658  20642 
R
2 or Pseudo-R
2 0.07  0.20  0.13 
Panel B: Percentage effects - assuming no ability bias 
Certificate Level I or II  0% (ns)  -6% (ns)  16% 
Certificate Level III or IV  7%  21%  5% 
Diploma or Advanced 
Diploma 
13% 22%  7% 
Panel C: Percentage effects - assuming 10% upwards ability bias 
Certificate Level I or II  0% (ns)  -6% (ns)  16% 
Certificate Level III or IV  7%  19%  5% 
Diploma or Advanced 
Diploma 
12% 20%  7% 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the person level, in brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. All specifications are estimated for respondents 
aged between 25 and 64, and not presently studying. Specifications in column 1 are restricted to those with 
positive hourly wages, and specifications in column 2 are restricted to those with positive annual earnings. 
Regressions in columns 1 and 2 are estimated using OLS, and estimates in column 3 are marginal effects 
from a probit model. All regressions include indicator variables for each single year of experience, 
interacted with the respondent’s sex, plus indicator variables for years of high schooling and year fixed 
effects. For columns 1 and 2, results in Panels B and C are calculated as exp(β)-1 and 0.9*(exp(β)-1), 
respectively. For column 3, results in Panels B and C are identical to the marginal effects shown in Panel 
A. ns=not statistically significant. 
  xxiiTABLE 4 
POST-SCHOOL QUALIFICATIONS AND EARNINGS 
 
Sample is respondents with 12 years of schooling. All estimates are relative to those 
with no post-school qualifications. 
Panel A: Regression results 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 




Certificate Level III or IV  -0.025  -0.029  0.002 
 [0.027]  [0.042]  [0.020] 
Diploma or Advanced 
Diploma 0.131***  0.172***  0.030* 
 [0.027]  [0.043]  [0.016] 
Bachelor degree  0.303***  0.406***  0.103*** 
 [0.023]  [0.034]  [0.013] 
Graduate Diploma or 
Graduate Certificate  0.328***  0.380***  0.110*** 
 [0.027]  [0.046]  [0.015] 
Masters or Doctorate  0.373***  0.553***  0.114*** 
 [0.035]  [0.052]  [0.016] 
Observations 11414  12273  15348 
R
2 or Pseudo-R
2 0.13  0.18  0.11 
Panel B: Percentage effects - assuming no ability bias 
Certificate Level III or IV  -2% (ns)  -3% (ns)  0% (ns) 
Diploma or Advanced 
Diploma 
14% 19%  3% 
Bachelor degree  35%  50%  10% 
Graduate Diploma or 
Graduate Certificate 
39% 46% 11% 
Masters or Doctorate  45%  74%  11% 
Panel C: Percentage effects - assuming 10% upwards ability bias 
Certificate Level III or IV  -3% (ns)  -3% (ns)  0% (ns) 
Diploma or Advanced 
Diploma 
13% 17%  3% 
Bachelor degree  32%  45%  10% 
Graduate Diploma or 
Graduate Certificate 
35% 42% 11% 
Masters or Doctorate  41%  66%  11% 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the person level, in brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. All specifications are estimated for respondents 
aged between 25 and 64, and not presently studying. Specifications in column 1 are restricted to those with 
positive hourly wages, and specifications in column 2 are restricted to those with positive annual earnings. 
Regressions in columns 1 and 2 are estimated using OLS, and estimates in column 3 are marginal effects 
from a probit model. All regressions include indicator variables for each single year of experience, 
interacted with the respondent’s sex, plus year fixed effects. Certificate Level I/II was not included, since it 
is regarded as a lower qualification than 12 years of schooling. For columns 1 and 2, results in Panels B and 
C are calculated as exp(β)-1 and 0.9*(exp(β)-1), respectively. For column 3, results in Panels B and C are 
identical to the marginal effects shown in Panel A. ns=not statistically significant. 
  xxiiiTABLE 5 
DO THE BENEFITS OF EDUCATION DIFFER ACROSS THE EARNINGS DISTRIBUTION? 
 
Estimates are the difference between the return at the 75th percentile of the 
conditional distribution and the 25th percentile 
Panel A: High school and earnings 
 (1)  (2) 
Dependent variable:  Log hourly wage  Log annual earnings 
Grade 10  -0.001  -0.019 
 [0.020]  [0.041] 
Grade 11  0.011  -0.011 
 [0.025]  [0.058] 
Grade 12  0.084***  -0.085* 
 [0.024]  [0.047] 
Observations 9022  9861 
Panel B: Vocational training and earnings 
Certificate Level I or II  0.004  0.023 
 [0.031]  [0.051] 
Certificate Level III or IV  0.021**  -0.051** 
 [0.010]  [0.021] 
Diploma or Advanced Diploma  0.084***  0.022 
 [0.026]  [0.050] 
Observations 11717  12754 
Panel C: Post-school qualifications and earnings 
Certificate Level III or IV  -0.042*  -0.023 
 [0.024]  [0.027] 
Diploma or Advanced Diploma  0.011  0.02 
 [0.022]  [0.035] 
Bachelor degree  0.044***  -0.019 
 [0.012]  [0.021] 
Graduate Diploma or Graduate 
Certificate -0.014  -0.024 
 [0.026]  [0.031] 
Masters or Doctorate  -0.026  -0.065** 
 [0.026]  [0.031] 
Observations 11444  12315 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the person level, in brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Estimates are from inter-quartile regressions. All 
specifications are estimated for respondents aged between 25 and 64, and not presently studying. Sample in 
Panel A is respondents with 9-12 years of schooling and no post-school qualifications. Sample in Panel B is 
respondents with 11 or fewer years of schooling. Sample in Panel C is respondents with 12 years of 
schooling. Specifications in column 1 are restricted to those with positive hourly wages, and specifications 
in column 2 are restricted to those with positive annual earnings. All regressions include indicator variables 
for each single year of experience, interacted with the respondent’s sex, plus year fixed effects. Regressions 
in Panel B also control for years of high schooling. 
  xxivTABLE 6 
PER-YEAR RETURNS TO EDUCATION 
 
All results are percentage effects, assuming 10% upwards ability bias  
 (1)  (2)  (3) 




Panel A: High school and earnings  
Sample is respondents with no post-school qualifications 
Grade 10  9%  20%  5% 
Grade 11  0% (ns)  7% (ns)  8% 
Grade 12  11%  30%  6% 
Panel B: Vocational training and earnings  
Sample is respondents with 11 or fewer years of high school 
Certificate Level I or II  1% (ns)  -12% (ns)  31% 
Certificate Level III or IV  7%  19%  5% 
Diploma or Advanced 
Diploma 6%  10%  4% 
Panel C: Post-school qualifications and earnings  
Sample is respondents with 12 years of high school 
Certificate Level III or IV  -3% (ns)  -3% (ns)  0% (ns) 
Diploma or Advanced 
Diploma 6%  8%  2% 
Bachelor degree  11%  15%  3% 
Graduate Diploma or 
Graduate Certificate  9%  10%  3% 
Masters or Doctorate  8%  13%  2% 
Note: Results are based on percentage effects in Panel C of Tables 2, 3, and 4, divided by the number of 
years of full-time study assumed for each the qualification (0.5 years for Certificate I/II, 1 year for 
Certificate III/IV, 2 years for a Diploma or Advanced Diploma, 3 years for a Bachelor degree, Bachelor 
degree, 4 years for a Graduate Diploma or Graduate Certificate, and 5 years for a Masters or Doctorate). 
ns=not statistically significant.  
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